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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-STATUTORY LIABILITY FOR MOB VIOLENCEDEFINITION OF CORRECTIONAL POWER-On August 12, 1947 eight Negro
families moved into a Chicago public housing development which was
occupied largely by white families. On the evening of August 14, several
thousand people, protesting the Negro intrusion, congregated in the area,
blocking traffic and brandishing bats, bricks, and stones. A large number
of policemen were on duty at the scene. The automobile of the plaintiff,
a Negro, was intercepted at an intersection by the crowd which began
throwing bricks at the occupants of the car. The plaintiff was struck by one
missile and suffered severe physical injury. He brought suit against the
city under the Illinois mob violence statute, which gives a cause of action
to any person injured by a "mob."1 The statute defines a "mob" as " . . .
any collection of individuals, five or more in number, assembled for the
. . . purpose of exercising correctional powers or regulative powers over
any person by violence, and without lawful authority. . . ." 2 The trial
court directed a verdict for the defendant. On appeal, held, reversed.
The huge crowd, by supplanting the lawful but comparatively powerless
authority of the municipality in the streets around the housing develop,
ment, had assumed powers lawfully vested in the local authorities. The
attempt to expel the Negroes from the area, an object which the crowd
believed to be within the community interest, constituted the exercise of
"correctional powers" by violence and without lawful authority within the
meaning of the sta.tute. Slaton v. Chicago, 8 Ill. App. (2d) 47, 130 N.E.
(2d) 205 (1955).
Although municipal corporations are not liable at common law for
injuries to persons or property caused by mobs,3 statutory liability is of
ancient origin.4 More than half of the states now have statutes which place
the burden of indemnifying victims of mob violence upon the taxpayers
of the community. 5 Influenced strongly by the long history of this statutory
liability, the courts have uniformly upheld its constitutionality.6 While
some statutes do not expressly define the term "mob," 7 "leaving the difficult
Ill. Rev. Stat. .(1955) c. 38, §515.
Id., §512.
a Marshall v. Buffalo, 50 App. Div. 149, 64 N.Y.S. 411 (1900); Iola v. Birnbaum, 71
Kan. 600, 81 P. 198 (1905).
4 See 1 REEVES, HlsTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 2d ed., 17 (1787).
5 On the general subject, see 6 Ford. L. REv. 270 (1937).
G As long as the legislation is reasonably adapted to the maintenance of public order
it is valid. Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313, 32 S.Ct. 92 (1911); Darlington v. City of New
York, 31 N.Y. 164 (1865).
7 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. (1949) §698.
1
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task of definition to the courts, 8 five states define it in terms of an assembly
which has the purpose of exercising correctional powers over a person by
violence and without lawful authority. 9 The courts in these five states
have applied to this legislation the dubious rule that statutes in derogation
of the common law are to be strictly construed and, therefore, have seldom
allowed recovery.10 Typically, these courts require a showing that the
mob employed its powers for the purpose of punishing the plaintiff's violation of a rule or regulation11 which some group constituted by law could
legally enforce.12 The principal case departs from this judicial construction of "correctional powers" in two respects. First; the purpose of the
crowd does not have to be, in fact, a public purpose; it need only be what
the crowd assumes is a public purpose. The fact that the acts of the mob
do not further the well-being of the community is not controlling.13 Thus,
the plaintiff need not show that he was punished by the crowd for some
violation of an actual rule or law.14 He need only demonstrate that his
person or his conduct was somehow offensive to the peculiar views and
desires of the crowd. Secondly, while it is still necessary that the mob assume
functions which have been delegated to the local authorities,1 5 the powers
so assumed need only be incidental to the main purpose of the crowd.
Thus, in the principal case, complete control of the area, including the
regulation of traffic, was only incidental to the main purpose of inflicting
harm on any Negroes in the area. This departure from previous cases is
the result of a basic difference in the court's conception of the intent of
the legislature in enacting the statute. Former cases have held that the
statute was designed to spur the local authorities to greater efforts at maintaining social order.16 The city, however, is liable whether it has been
negligent or not,17 and since it may be utterly powerless to quell the mob
s Marshall v. Buffalo,• note 3 supra.
Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 38, §512; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1956) §10-3304; Ohio Rev.
Code (Baldwin, 1953) §3761.01; W.Va. Code (1955) §6038; N.J. Stat. Ann. (1952) §2A:48-8.
10 See, e.g., Meadows v. City of Logan, 121 W.Va. 51, I S.E. (2d) 394 (1939).
11 Where a strikebreaker was seized and beaten by a group of hostile strikers, recovery
was denied on the basis that the plaintiff had a right to continue working during the
strike. Shake v. Board of Commissioners, 210 Ind. 61, 1 N.E. (2d) 132 (1935).
12 In Anderson v. Chicago, 313 Ill. App. 616 at 623, 40 N.E. (2d) 601 (1942), the
court denied that a group of armed strike sympathizers constituted a mob within the
statutory definition: " . . . it is inconceivable ... that the strike sympathizers here could
be lawfully empowered to use violence to coerce non-strikers to conform."
13 See Meadows v. City of Logan, note 10 supra. Lexa v. Zmunt, 123 Ohio St. 510,
176 N.E. 82 (1931), supports the view that the purpose of the mob may be to punish persons who violate its own peculiar standards of conduct and may still fall within the
statutory language. See also the dissent in Shake v. Board of Commissioners, note 11
supra.
14 Anderson v. Chicago, note 12 supra.
15 See Hailey v. Newark, 22 N.J. Misc. 139, 36 A. (2d) 210 (1944); Anderson v. Chicago,
note 12 supra.
16 Butte Miners Union v. City of Butte, 58 Mont. 391, 194 P. 149 (1920).
17 See Chicago v. Sturges, note 6 supra; Marshall v. Buffalo, note 3 supra. As to the
efficacy of this type of legislation, see CHADBOURN, LYNCHING ANO TIIE LAw 50-57 (1933).
9
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(as it may have been in the principal case) it is difficult to see how this
statutory liability would achieve the hoped-for result. A more realistic
interpretation of the legislative intent, suggested by the principal case, is
that the act is designed to impress on the taxpaying public the cost of mob
violence to the individual and thus bring the sobriety of the disgruntled
taxpayer to bear on the less responsible members of the community.18

Nathan B. Driggers

18 See Borchard, "State and Municipal Liability in Tort-Proposed Statutory Reform,''
20 A. B. A. J. 747 (1934).

